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      Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the*
Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 06-2207
                              
OSVALDO IRIZARRY, JR.,
Appellant
v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00231)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 19, 2007
Before: McKEE, AMBRO and MICHEL , Circuit Judges*
(filed: May 23, 2007 )
                              
OPINION
                              
2AMBRO, Circuit Judge:
Osvaldo Irizarry, Jr. appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision to deny his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. 
Irizarry asserts that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is unsupported
by substantial evidence.  For the reasons that follow, we vacate the District Court’s order
and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History: 
Irizarry filed an application for SSI benefits alleging disability due to anxiety and
depression beginning in August 2002.  After his application was denied, Irizarry
requested and was granted a hearing before an ALJ.  The ALJ denied Irizarry’s
application, finding that Irizarry was not disabled and could perform a significant number
of jobs in the national economy.  Irizarry requested the Appeals Council to review the
ALJ’s decision.  It declined and the ALJ’s decision became the final agency decision. 
Irizarry then filed for review in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, that Court ruled against
Irizarry, who now appeals to us.
Because we write solely for the parties, we note only those facts relevant to our
analysis.  Irizarry was 20 years old at the onset date of his alleged disability.  Until
January 2002, he had served 14 months in prison.  After his release, he worked as a stock
     Global functioning or global assessment functioning scores are used by mental health1
clinicians and doctors to rate the social, occupational and psychological functioning of
adults.  See 65 F.R. 50746-01, 50764 – 65 (Social Security Administration Rules and
Regulations).  It is endorsed by the American Psychiatric Association and assesses an
individual’s functional abilities and limitations.  See id.  
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clerk, telemarketer, and a cook.  At each of these jobs, he was employed for no more than
two months. 
While incarcerated, Irizarry received treatment and medication for depression and
anxiety.  After his release, he sought treatment from the Washington Hospital and the
Washington Communities MH/MR Center (the “Washington Center”).  He was diagnosed
with major depressive disorder, severe and generalized anxiety disorder, and anti-social
personality disorder.  The doctors assigned him global functioning scores (“GAFs”)
ranging from 30 to 37.  At the Washington Center, he reported a history of suicide1
attempts, including one documented attempt involving an overdose of medication and
cleaning fluid.
In February 2002, Irizarry began counseling and medication management with Dr.
Leyla Somen, a psychiatrist.  Although Irizarry reported hallucinations, Dr. Somen noted
that this claim was “not convincing.”  She assigned a GAF score of 47.  At the end of
February, she instructed Irizarry to stop taking his medications because he was
experiencing side effects.  After being off his medication for one month, he reported
severe depression, and Dr. Somen referred him to a hospital for evaluation. 
Irizzary went to an emergency room threatening to commit suicide in April 2002. 
      The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 2
We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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He was admitted and treated with anti-depressant medication.  On his discharge, he was
given prescriptions for anti-anxiety agents and anti-depressants.  His GAF rating on
discharge was 46.
In October 2002, Irizarry underwent a psychological evaluation with Dr. John
Rohar at the request of the State Bureau of Disability determinations.  Dr. Rohar found
Irizarry to have a flat affect and to be mildly to moderately depressed.  On examination,
Dr. Rohar noted that Irizarry had intact thought processes and demonstrated average
intelligence.  According to Dr. Rohar, Irizarry had a “fair” ability to relate to co-workers,
use judgment, and interact with supervisors.  In the end, Dr. Rohar assessed a GAF rating
of 55.
Dr. Edward Zuckerman, a state agency psychologist, in December 2002 reviewed
the evidence of record and completed an assessment of Irizarry’s mental impairments. 
Dr. Zuckerman concluded that Irizarry would have moderately limited ability to maintain 
attention and concentration for extended periods.  Further, Dr. Zuckerman noted no other
significant limitations.  
II.  Standard of Review
In an appeal of a District Court’s decision affirming the Commissioner’s denial of
SSI benefits, we exercise plenary review over legal issues.   Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d2
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396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the ALJ’s factual findings to determine whether they
are supported by substantial evidence.  Id.  “‘Substantial evidence’ has been defined as
‘more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).  “Where the ALJ’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings,
even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”  Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001). 
III.  Discussion 
Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration is authorized to
pay SSI benefits to persons who are “disabled.”  42 U.S.C. § 1382 .   A person is disabled
“only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,
21–22 (2003).  
To determine disability, the Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation
process.   20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir.
1999).  If a finding of disability or non-disability can be made at any point in the
sequential analysis, the Commissioner does not review the claim further.  20 C.F.R.
     At step one, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in3
substantial gainful activity.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).  If so, the claimant is not disabled
regardless of her medical condition.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).  If not engaged in
substantial gainful activity, step two requires the Commissioner to consider whether a
“severe” impairment or combination of impairments exists that significantly limit the
claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.  20 C.F.R § 404.1520(c). 
If a claimant’s condition is deemed severe, the analysis continues to step three.  See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).  
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§ 404.1520(a)(4).   Here, the focus is on steps three, four, and five.3
The Commissioner, in step three, consults Appendix 1 of the regulations to
determine whether the claimant’s impairment or its equivalent is listed.  20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt P, App.1 (listing impairments presumed to be
severe enough to preclude substantial gainful activity).  If a claimant does not suffer from
a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps four and five.  In step
four, the Commissioner determines whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant
has the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work.  20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(e).  She bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to do so. 
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000).  At step five, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner.  Here the Commissioner must demonstrate that the
claimant is capable of performing other available work in the national economy in order
to deny a claim of disability.  20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520(f).  To make this determination, the
Commissioner considers a claimant’s residual functional capacity along with her age,
education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g); Burnett, 220 F.3d at 118.
     We find it unnecessary to address Irizarry’s step five argument because we hold that4
the ALJ erred at an earlier stage of the sequential analysis.  
      The Government correctly points out that most of the medical evidence related to5
Irizarry’s mental impairments predates the alleged onset of disability.  If this fact were
relevant to the ALJ’s rejection of medical evidence, then the ALJ needs to state it to
ensure meaningful judicial review.  See Cotter, 642 F.3d at 704.  Further, the facts
indicate that this alleged onset disability date was chosen because Irizarry did not need
disability benefits until August 2002 when he was terminated from his last job. 
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Irizarry claims that the ALJ erred at steps three and four because the ALJ’s
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.  Specifically, Irizarry argues that the
ALJ failed to: (1) follow our Court’s holding in Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir.
1981), by not explaining his rejection of documented medical evidence or otherwise
affording proper weight to Irizarry’s treating medical sources; and (2) interpret properly
the consultative psychiatrists ratings of “fair” with regard to Irizarry’s occupational
ability.4
The ALJ must consider all evidence and is required to state the reasons for his
decision to ensure meaningful judicial review.  Cotter, 642 F.3d at 704; see also Wier v.
Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 956 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here, the ALJ only discussed medical
evidence offered by Dr. Rohar.  The ALJ’s opinion notes that Dr. Rohar assessed
Irizarry’s GAF at 55.  Notably absent from this discussion are the two earlier lower GAF
scores found by Dr. Somen and the Washington Center.  Further, the ALJ’s opinion omits
any discussion of Irizarry’s treatment at the Washington Center or with Dr. Somen.  5
These omissions fail to follow Cotter’s mandate that an ALJ’s rejection of treating
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medical sources be explained.  
* * * * *
Because the ALJ did not discuss all of the relevant evidence or explain his
rejection of medical evidence offered by Irizarry as he was required to do under Cotter,
his decision is unsupported by substantial evidence.  We therefore vacate the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  “On remand, the ALJ must consider and make
specific findings as to all of the relevant probative medical evidence. . . .  Further, to the
extent that the ALJ reaches a finding contradictory to that of [Irizarry’s] treating
physicians, he must explain the reasoning behind such a finding, including reconciling
conflicts and discussing how and why probative evidence supporting [Irizarry’s] claim
was discounted or rejected.”  Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 44.
